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Abstract—The Internet is often thought to be a model of re-
silience, due to a decentralised, organically-grown architecture.
This paper puts this perception into perspective through the
results of a security analysis of the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) routing infrastructure. BGP is a fundamental Internet
protocol and its intrinsic fragilities have been highlighted
extensively in the literature. A seldom studied aspect is how
robust the BGP infrastructure actually is as a result of nearly
three decades of perpetual growth. Although global black-outs
seem unlikely, local security events raise growing concerns on
the robustness of the backbone. In order to better protect
this critical infrastructure, it is crucial to understand its
topology in the context of the weaknesses of BGP and to
identify possible security scenarios. Firstly, we establish a
comprehensive threat model that classifies main attack vec-
tors, including but non limited to BGP vulnerabilities. We
then construct maps of the European BGP backbone based
on publicly available routing data. We analyse the topology
of the backbone and establish several disruption scenarios
that highlight the possible consequences of different types
of attacks, for different attack capabilities. We also discuss
existing mitigation and recovery strategies, and we propose
improvements to enhance the robustness and resilience of the
backbone. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine
a comprehensive threat analysis of BGP infrastructures with
advanced network topology considerations. We find that the
BGP infrastructure is at higher risk than already understood,
due to topologies that remain vulnerable to certain targeted
attacks as a result of organic deployment over the years.
Significant parts of the system are still uncharted territory,
which warrants further investigation in this direction.
1. Introduction
The Internet has become a critical infrastructure. It is
now essential to fuel the world’s economy, to the func-
tioning of developed societies, not to mention its pervasive
importance in the daily and social life of billions of people.
Disrupting it would have devastating consequences, similar
in importance to disruptions to the power grid or to transport
networks. So far, however, Internet disruptions have been lo-
cal and temporary, the resilience of the network of networks
is often cited as a remarkable emergent phenomenon. This
study approaches this idea from multiple perspectives and
shows that more investigation and security improvements
are necessary for the Internet to be considered truly resilient
against targeted attacks.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto
standard for routing between large IP networks, called Au-
tonomous Systems (AS). ASs advertise their existence and
the range of addresses they own to the rest of the Internet.
BGP ensures all other ASs know about the various subnets
and how to reach them. Without BGP, each sub-network
would be isolated and unreachable.
Since its introduction in the 1980’s, BGP has grown to
become an important part of running the Internet’s core.
The infrastructure, both logical – i.e. AS routing tables –
and physical – i.e. BGP routers and the traffic highways
connecting them – is thus quite a critical one. However, like
many other key internet technologies, BGP as a protocol was
not designed with security requirements. There is plenty of
evidence to show that it is intrinsically fragile (e.g. [1]–[3])
and significant disruptions to parts of the backbone raise the
question of its robustness as a whole. The BGP infrastructure
has grown over the years into what is now a particularly
complex system. Such an organic growth results notably in a
scale-free topology that is known to be particularly resilient
against random failures but remains vulnerable to targeted
attacks [4].
This paper aims at shedding some light onto the security
of BGP infrastructures in Europe. Our methodology is repro-
ducible for other portions of the network, and the findings
of the paper are of high importance to network operators
and regulators both within and outside European countries.
Understanding the Internet as a critical infrastructure from
a security perspective is essential. Such a relatively young
system that has grown mostly unsupervised is a tempting
attack target. Technical operators are often limited to the
narrow scope of their own sub-systems and require a better
knowledge of the overall picture.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine a
comprehensive threat analysis of BGP infrastructures with
advanced network topology considerations. On the one hand,
existing work in the domain has extensively investigated
the logical topology of the BGP infrastructure. Important
properties of the network (e.g. its hierarchical, scale-free
nature) have been identified by several contributions (cf. [5],
[6]). However, such analysis offers a network perspective
and does not take security aspects into consideration. On
the other hand, works proposing security-driven analysis
of BGP topologies often focus on a particular type of
attack, such as BGP hijacks (e.g. [7], [8]), focusing solely
on the vulnerabilities posed by the protocol specification
and not how such vulnerabilities interplay with real world
deployments outside of high profile incidents. This study
considers the whole spectrum of possible threats to put
topology analysis into perspective. In this paper:
• We establish a comprehensive threat model (section
3) encompassing known BGP weaknesses but also
physical vulnerabilities and non BGP-specific attack
vectors. We also discuss existing improvements that
can address these vulnerabilities.
• We investigate the topology of backbone infrastruc-
tures (section 4) in the light of this threat model and
we highlight possible disruption scenarios (section
5) that leverage topological weaknesses via multiple
attack vectors, for variable attack means.
• We propose strategies for improving the topology
(section 6) of the backbone and enhance its robust-
ness and resilience against such targeted attacks.
2. Background
We begin by giving an overview of the BGP protocol
and presenting backbone infrastructures.
2.1. BGP Route Announcement
Individual computers, both servers and clients, are con-
nected to the wider Internet using a web of various net-
working devices, including switches and routers, that ensure
delivery of traffic to its intended destination. When a net-
work of these devices is managed by one organisation, such
as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), they are commonly
referred to as an Autonomous System (AS). Routers within
a single AS would be under a unified administrative con-
trol, following the same routing policy and using the same
routing protocol(s).
Different protocols are in use for the intercommunication
of routers either within an AS or in between different ASs.
BGP is the main protocol used for routing inter-AS traffic
[9]. BGP routers – or gateways – communicate with each
other over TCP and advertise accessible addresses in their
respective ASs and available routes towards other ASs.
Accessible addresses are announced via IP prefixes
that combine an IP address (for instance 1.0.0.0 for
IPv4) and a prefix length measuring a number of bits in
this address. For instance, 1.0.0.0/8 identifies all IP ad-
dresses of which the first 8 bits match the first 8 bits of
1.0.0.0, i.e. {1.0.0.0, 1.0.0.1, 1.0.0.2, . . . , 1.255.255.255}.
The longer the prefix, the smaller the corresponding set of
IP, the more specific the prefix is. An AS can therefore
delegate one of its subprefixes to another AS via commercial
agreements. For instance, in Fig. 1, AS 2 is the owner of
prefix 2.0.0.0/8 and delegates the 2.3.0.0/16 prefix to AS 3.
BGP announcements combine a prefix with a path
towards the destination AS. Gateways advertise a direct
path towards their own AS, and they can also learn from
other gateway announcements and advertise indirect routes
Figure 1: Example BGP routing: traffic reaches AS3 via a
route advertised by AS3, AS2 and AS1 successively.
towards remote prefixes. For instance, in Fig. 1, AS3 an-
nounces the 2.3.0.0/16 prefix as a direct route toward itself.
Its provider AS2 announces the same prefix with the path
AS2→AS3. AS2’s peer AS1 then announces the prefix via
its own network with a AS1→AS2→AS3 path, and so on.
Announcements are thus propagated from neighbour to
neighbour, according to network topologies and commercial
agreements that can be divided roughly into two categories:
• Peering agreements are symmetrical and result in
two ASs advertising each other’s routes and sharing
each other’s traffic.
• Customer/provider agreements introduce an asym-
metrical relation where one AS provides access to
another – the latter buying transit from the former.
2.2. BGP Path Selection
BGP routes are being constantly advertised, updated or
withdrawn. Each BGP router monitors these announcements
and selects the best routes to use amongst all possible alter-
natives, according to a number of criteria. The path selection
algorithm first ensures that a number of basic assumptions
hold, such as checking that the next hop in a path has
a valid route. Then the algorithm attaches weights to the
paths in order to rank them, preferring locally originated
and shortest paths, and longer (i.e. more specific) prefixes.
Rules could be applied to the said path selection process in
order to influence it in some way in order to balance cost,
performance, reliability and other factors. This is known as
a routing policy, which is not part of the protocol but a
deployment configuration choice.
The routing policy allows each AS operator to set their
own criteria for weighing paths. A common objective within
routing policies, for instance, is to reduce costs through
favouring peering routes (usually free of charge) against
costly transit routes. Latency and congestion are other pos-
sible criteria that network engineers can take into account
when weighing paths. Gateways then select the best paths
accordingly, and install such paths in their forwarding tables
which are subsequently used to route traffic.
At this stage, it is worth noting that there is no explicit
path negotiation in BGP: communication between BGP
routers is limited to path and prefix announcements only, and
each gateway administrator is responsible for establishing
their own routing policy and BGP announcements. In par-
ticular, there is no authentication procedure and no path val-
idation mechanism that would allow a router to verify a path
beyond its direct connections with other gateways. Certain
heuristics commonly used by path selection algorithms –
such as preference towards short paths and specific prefixes
– can easily be abused, as shown in the next sections.
2.3. Logical Topology of the Backbone
The logical topology of BGP infrastructures has been
extensively investigated by network analysts. Publications in
the domain propose taxonomies that differ in their denom-
inations, but globally it is agreed that BGP infrastructures
follow a structure in three layers [7], [8], [10]:
• Tier-1 (also: transit, core) ASs that can access the
entire address space without buying transit from
any other AS. The list of tier-1 networks has been
relatively stable over the last decade, major networks
entering the club or leaving it depending on commer-
cial agreements (cf. Table 1).
• Tier-2 ASs buy transit from at least another (tier-1 or
tier-2) AS and peer with or provide transit to other
ASs. The largest Tier-2 ASs are comparable in size
and in importance to tier-1 networks, at least in the
regions where they operate.
• Tier-3 (also: leaf, edge or marginal) ASs connect to
the Internet by peering with or buying transit from
higher-tier ASs exclusively.
Name Country AS number
AT&T US 7018
CenturyLink US 209, 3561
Cogent US 174
Deutsche Telekom Germany 3320




Telecom Italia Sparkle Italy 6762
TeliaSonera Sweden - Finland 1299
Tinet/GTT US - Italy 3257
Verizon US 701, 702, 703
TABLE 1: Tier-1 Autonomous Systems as of 2015.
It is generally recognised that the graph of BGP
nodes follows a scale-free distribution [5], [6] typical
of organically-grown networks, where newcomers connect
preferably to existing high-degree nodes. This means in
particular that high-degree tier-1 ASs concentrate a majority
of the edges of the graph.
2.4. Physical Topology of the Backbone
ASs connect physically with each other at colocation
points where their routers can directly exchange traffic
via dedicated high-performance infrastructures. Historically,
international carriers provide transit at private Points of
Presence (PoP) whereas public Internet eXchange Points
(IXP) are dedicated to peering. In practice the distinction
is not always as clear, notably in Europe where IXPs are
now becoming mainstream transit providers [11], [12].
Colocation points are physical hubs linked by traffic
highways, and notably submarine cables (Fig. 2). These
large-scale, international infrastructures are owned by tier-1
and large tier-2 ASs, either as a monopoly or as a con-
sortium. These networks are exploited either via AS-level
transit agreements or via direct leasing. Submarine cables
constitute major choke points of the physical infrastructure,
for instance, in Europe:
• A limited number of cables (a dozen) join the two
sides of the Atlantic ocean: despite the complexity of
routing tables, all traffic between Europe and Amer-
ica eventually goes through one of these cables.
• All cables tend to converge to the same colocation
points: London for instance is visited by a majority
of transatlantic and UK-Europe cables (Fig. 3).
Figure 2: Submarine cables, current and planned [13].
Figure 3: Major carrier landlines converging to the same
colocation points [14].
3. BGP Threat Model
This section provides a short review of different BGP
threats described in the literature, not limited to the specific
shortcomings of BGP itself. Firstly we classify possible at-
tackers in terms of their nature and corresponding offensive
capabilities. Then we identify four categories of threats:
• Hijacks, exploiting the lack of authentication and
path validation in BGP to manipulate routing tables.
• Gateway attacks exploiting either the BGP protocol
itself or generic router vulnerabilities.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
• Physical attacks to colocation points, landlines and
undersea cables.
We describe each threat, in particular in terms of their
accessibility for different types of attackers, we comment
on countermeasures, and we explore recovery methods. This
work is based on a systematic literature review (SLR) that
surveyed a total of 4,248 papers from six major online digital
libraries1, 579 of which were manually screened culminating
in a final set of 66 related publications.
3.1. Attacker Taxonomy
The nature of attackers and the means at their disposal
are an important factor to consider in a threat model. Almost
all security incidents in the history of the Internet backbone
have been attributed to non-malicious mistakes. However,
the current security scene is composed of a variety of
potential attackers with various offensive capabilities:
• Isolated individuals, with very limited capabilities
and opportunistic behaviour (in general).
• Small groups of diverse motivations, with limited
capabilities and variable degrees of expertise.
• Full-fledged organisations (criminal and non-
criminal), with substantial capabilities.
• Nation-states, some with unprecedented offensive
capabilities and supporting infrastructures.
The potential of some attacks presented in this section is
correlated with the means of the attacker. For instance, DoS
attacks grow in power according to the size of the attacker’s
infrastructure. There is little foresight of what could happen
in case large organisations or states started to use DoS
attacks openly as an act of war. The same goes for BGP
hijacks: if a significant number of ASs started to maliciously
and repeatedly try to disrupt each other, the behaviour of
the backbone would certainly become unpredictable. In both
cases, engaging unprecedented means into an attack could
turn the tables in the global Internet landscape.
For some kinds of attacks however, large-scale effects
could be at hand for very limited attackers. Generic router
security flaws and “ping of death” attacks do allow a single
individual to take down routers individually. Due to the
1. ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, Springer Link,
Web of Science, and Wiley Online Library.
concentration of high numbers of core routers, landlines
and undersea cables at a handful of key locations, local
physical attacks could also prove very efficient at taking
down large parts of the BGP infrastructure. Such attacks
do require expertise and specific personnel, yet they can be
carried out by limited groups without the infrastructure and
financial capabilities of nation-states or large international
organisations.
3.2. BGP Hijacks
Description. A prefix hijack is where an AS advertises
false prefixes, claiming to have routes to address spaces
that do not belong to it [3], [15]–[32]. When such BGP
advertisements are propagated, potentially large amounts
of traffic are redirected to the advertising network rather
than to the intended destination. For instance, defensive
“blackholing” hijacks allow administrators to drop traffic
and isolate a network under attack [33]. A prefix hijack
is indistinguishable from legitimate traffic engineering op-
erations where network administrators rely on advertising
additional prefixes to optimise their routing tables. Hence,
the stability of the whole system relies on practice-based
heuristics and mutual benevolence between ASs.
Prefix hijacks can either be intentional (and possibly
malicious) or unintentional (i.e. misconfigurations, cf. [15],
[34], [35]). In either case, the result of a prefix hijack is
having rogue entries in the routing tables which may in
turn cause disruptions or denial of service. Furthermore, the
attacker (if any) could exploit the redirected traffic to carry
out other attacks such as spamming [27], phishing [28], or
Man In The Middle (MITM) operations [25], [26], [36]. In
many cases, the recipient of the misdirected traffic collapses
under the unexpected load.
In practice, almost all prefix hijacks are attributed to
either misconfiguration (i.e. human error) or software mal-
function [15], [19]. This includes commonly cited incidents
such as those relating to AS7007 [22], AS3561 [23], as
well as the global YouTube outage in 2008 [32]. Very few
deliberate attacks have ever been documented until very
recently (cf. [36]–[39]) which in itself is remarkable.
By nature, hijacks are sophisticated attacks, accessible
only to organisations able to either build and maintain an AS
of significant size or to take control of such an infrastructure
via other means.
Protection. The BGP protocol is fundamentally insecure
since prefix origins are not authenticated: there is no way
to handle or even detect prefix hijacks with standard BGP
alone. This lack of authentication has been identified in the
literature [40] and several extensions of the protocol propose
to address this issue. The main contenders here include
BGPSEC [41], S-BGP [42], HI [43], soBGP [44], psBGP
[45], IRV [46], OA [47], SPV [48], and many more. Aside
from the effects on router performance [49] and partial
security improvements [50], several works have studied the
efficacy of partial and mixed deployments of the proposed
secure BGP variants [1], [18], [51]–[53] and new attacks
defeating secure extensions have been proposed [54].
A recent study [21] has identified that the key to improv-
ing BGP security is to ensure routing policies that com-
plement authentication protocols. In other words, a whole
BGP deployment could be remarkably undermined if the
involved ASs do not prioritise security when dealing with
insecure BGP advertisements, which is not at all uncommon
according to a recent survey [55]. Whitelist-based prefix
filtering and path validation are the two main complements
to authentication identified so far [1].
Recovery. Hijack recovery consists in restoring legitimate
routing tables by withdrawing bogus routes and / or overrid-
ing it by preferable routes (i.e. routes with longer prefixes
and shorter paths). The hijacked AS may advertise new
specific routes and try to override the faulty conflicting
announcements. Most major prefix hijacking events are han-
dled manually in a few hours of time, which is the typical
delay for corrected routing announcements to diffuse over
the entire network.
Since there is no explicit recovery procedure in BGP,
mitigation of past incidents has relied on collaboration be-
tween the involved parties: the rogue routes were withdrawn
as soon as possible, and all the ASs involved took measures
to rectify their systems. However, there is no occurrence
of an openly conflictual situation where a hijacker would
continuously hijack a prefix and refuse to collaborate.
Malicious ASs that repeatedly attempt to hijack other
ASs can be manually identified and blacklisted. However,
large-scale malicious scenarios where large ASs would be in
open confrontation with each other and keep on advertising
conflicting routes are yet to be investigated. In particular, the
lack of a global authority able to resolve such conflicts and
ensure overall coherence could prevent the entire network
from stabilising as long as the conflict continues.
3.3. Gateway Elimination Attacks
Description. BGP routers can be attacked via any of their
operational platforms, which includes common operating
system and firmware vulnerabilities. Listing such attacks
is out of the scope of this study. BGP routers are owned
and managed by different companies following different ad-
ministration policies. However, they often rely on the same
physical hardware and software basis of their systems. As a
consequence, a security breach in one of these components
may affect a significant number of systems and make them
fail in the same way due to a single type of attack – so-called
common mode failures. Dependencies to common assets are
difficult to identify and trace back, as such implementation
details are often not published for confidentiality reasons.
Sometimes even administrators are not fully aware of the
hardware and software basis their systems run on. Yet,
the transversal diffusion of these assets can compromise
large numbers of systems, the 512k event [56], the “Packet
of Death” [57] or the Shellshock vulnerability [58] being
relevant examples. Whether or not a 0-day could effectively
threaten the BGP infrastructure is yet to be demonstrated,
but for lack of evidence this should be considered as a
potential vulnerability.
Sophisticated BGP-specific attacks have been discussed
in the routing community for years, but never practically
proven to be possible until recently [24], [59]–[63]. The
attacker uses a combination of specific BGP messages to
overload the victim gateway router. For instance, the attacker
would use a large number of deaggregated IP prefixes in
order to create a significant volume of routing updates which
costs the victim in CPU time (similar tactic to a DoS attack,
cf. section 3.4). The attacker could also cause the victim’s
neighbours to stop responding to the victim, causing the
victim’s network buffers to overflow. These two factors are
enough for some routers to stop functioning until restarted.
These techniques are not necessarily new for attacking
neighbouring BGP peers (cf. [64], [65]). However, when
coupled with a simple targeting mechanism, they could be
used to single out a victim that could be anywhere in the
Internet backbone [62], [66].
BGP-specific gateway eliminations are sophisticated at-
tacks that require a backing BGP infrastructure, thus they
are reserved to the high end of the attacker spectrum. On
the other hand, some generic router vulnerabilities can be
exploited by individuals, which significantly increases the
risk associated with this kind of threat.
Protection. Up-to-date patching of vulnerabilities is the
main protection against generic attack vectors – again, de-
tailing these goes beyond the scope of this study. BGP-
specific gateway elimination attacks rely on the lack of path
validation and origin authentication. As with hijacks, RPKI-
based authentication, whitelist-based prefix filtering and path
validation can help thwart malicious message propagation.
However, these mechanisms have a cost in terms of network
and CPU consumption that can be leveraged by attackers and
result in other resource depletion techniques. In addition,
recent work has discussed how “best practices” could in
fact be self-defeating [62].
Recovery. Assuming the victim router does not suspect an
attack and accepts all the attacker’s updates, it quickly runs
out of memory and needs to be restarted. Upon restart,
the router would need further time in order to build its
forwarding tables. Failure to detect the attack would make
the router vulnerable to be eliminated again soon after
restarting. Thus, detection is important for both efficient
protection and rapid recovery. The literature does not detail
detection mechanisms but lessons could be learned from
SYN flood countermeasures [67].
3.4. Denial of Service Attacks
Description. A Denial of Service (DoS) is a disruption
attack that consists in flooding a network or a particular
machine with malicious traffic [2], [68]–[76]. This type of
attack is well understood and documented in the literature,
they are discussed here for the sake of completeness. A
DoS intends to disrupt and possibly blackout a system by
two different means:
• Overwhelming the target network with an unman-
ageable amount of traffic.
• Saturating the processing capabilities of the target
machines via excessive amounts of data.
DoS could happen unintentionally and without malicious
intent. This is when underprepared websites become ex-
tremely popular (e.g. due to breaking news or via social
media) and fail to cater to unexpected numbers of simulta-
neous service users [73].
Saturating the network or the processing capabilities
of an online service is usually no easy feat (although not
impossible, cf. [77]), in particular when the target benefits
from a solid, large-scale backing infrastructure. A single
machine is unlikely to have the capabilities to perform such
a task, and common defence systems can easily identify a
single DoS source and block its incoming attacks. Therefore,
DoS attackers often rely on multiple, distributed attack
sources, often in the form of large clusters of infected
machines – so-called botnets. When thousands of machines
controlled by an attacker contribute to a Distributed DoS
(DDoS), the aggregation of their individual power allows
to reach the large debits required for the attack, and the
source distribution prevents the victim from identifying and
defending efficiently from a single hostile source.
Botnets require significant amounts of resources to be
built and maintained. An alternative for achieving a DDoS
attack consists in diverting existing systems to perform
the attack. In this variant, called reflection and amplifica-
tion attack, the attacker queries multiple different providers
while redirecting the responses to its target. Any publicly
accessible service with weak authentication and providing
large responses to small queries can be exploited for this
purpose. The UDP protocol in particular lacks source val-
idation, which makes UDP-based protocols such as DNS,
NTP, SNMPv2, NetBIOS, etc. to be particularly exposed to
this kind of exploitation [78]. For instance, a DNS server
could provide a 3KB response to a 64 byte query, in
effect generating 50 times the traffic it receives from the
attacker towards an unsuspecting victim. The amplification
mechanism makes DoS attacks accessible even to attackers
with limited offensive capabilities.
Finally, the BGP-specific attack presented in section 3.3
exploits specificities of the BGP protocol to achieve the
same effect.
Depending on the effectiveness of the attack method and
on the victim’s defences, a (D)DoS attack may:
• Have no visible effect on the victim from the cus-
tomer’s perspective, while generating extra mainte-
nance and protection costs.
• Partially degrade services provided by the victim.
• Blackout the victim, making it unavailable from the
network as long as the attack continues.
• Severely damage the victim even after the attack has
finished, imposing costly repairs and maintenance
operations.
Protection. DoS protection usually relies on detecting and
filtering malicious sources. However, this is a difficult task
since malicious traffic can be indistinguishable from legit-
imate traffic. Using reflection also helps prevent efficient
filtering while hiding the true origin of the attack, as traffic
is generated by multiple, apparently legitimate sources such
as public services. A DoS attack based on redirected traffic
via a BGP hijack would also naturally appear to come out
of many legitimate sources.
Recovery. Efficient DDoS recovery requires extreme scala-
bility, with no bottleneck nor single point of failure, allowing
the network to cope with the attack traffic [72] by absorbing
and dispatching traffic surges. Such scalability capabilities
are so far reserved to the largest infrastructures and require
heavy preparation on both the nodes and the topology of the
infrastructure, discussed further in section 6.
3.5. Physical Attacks
BGP infrastructures are susceptible to a range of phys-
ical attacks. In addition to direct destructive attempts to
BGP routers, attackers can target the power infrastructure,
cooling systems, or other parts of the network fabric (such
as links and switches) that connect a router to the rest of
the infrastructure. Although an exhaustive taxonomy of such
attacks is beyond the scope of this study, we discuss here the
interplay between physical attacks and the logical topology
of the backbone.
Mapping the logical topology of the backbone to its
physical layout is difficult, as there is no straightforward way
to associate a given route to a particular line or colocation
point. Transatlantic cables for instance are usually shared by
several carriers, which means that a single cable cut would
cause trouble to several ASs simultaneously. In particular,
peering or buying transit from several providers does not
guarantee physical redundancy, as these networks could
favour the same cable to route their traffic. Since tier-1
networks peer with each other, a single cable cut would not
severely disrupt the backbone, as automatic re-routing would
shift the traffic onto other transit providers using different
cables. However, the case of several simultaneous cable cuts
is unprecedented in Europe. In other regions where a single
undersea cable carries a majority of the traffic, its disruption
usually results in massive losses of connectivity [79].
Major cables converge to colocation points that concen-
trate large numbers of key physical assets. In Europe in
particular, public (IXP) and private (PoP) colocation tends
to share common premises [11] which increases even more
the centrality of such physical hubs. As a result, complex
routing tables such as the ones shown in section 5 map
down to a handful of physical locations and lines between
them, while it remains difficult to determine exactly the
physical trajectory of traffic and vice-versa. Routine failures
of individual equipments has made physical redundancy a
strong requirement for such locations. However, it is unclear
how significant physical attacks carried on one or several
key colocation points would impact the entirety of the
backbone, as such attacks would simultaneously affect a
large number of routes at the logical layer.
4. Mapping the BGP Infrastructure in Europe
This section presents the data sources used for this study
and discusses their relevance and limitations.
4.1. Data Sources
RIPE (Re´seaux IP Europe´ens) is the regional Internet
registry for Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. RIPE
maintains the Routing Information Service (RIS) which
provides global routing updates (in 32-bit format) advertised
in a number of major IXPs in European cities such as
Amsterdam, Frankfurt and London since 2001 [80]. The
following sections present an analysis of the data from 5
different Remote Route Collectors (RRC), labelled hence-
forth as rrcx, where x varies from “a” to “e”. The exact
identity of these vantage points will not be disclosed.
4.2. Data Interpretation & Relevance
It is important to note that the AS graphs presented in
this paper – based on our preliminary investigations [81]
– are a collection of the routes seen from a particular
(European) vantage point in the network (example shown
in Fig. 4). The data presented here should not be seen as
a complete view of the network; it is nonetheless a repre-
sentative section of significant portions of several national
backbones in Europe and of their international connections
– for instance, to tier-1 ASs from the US. The data varies
across the different RRCs due to the specific topology – log-
ical and physical – of the corresponding IXPs; nonetheless,
the similarity of the analysis’ results (section 6) on these
different sources supports the relevance of the patterns it
exhibits.
The coverage that our vantage points provide is difficult
to ascertain. Complete routing tables from a single RRC –
e.g. the one shown in Fig. 4, AS count on Table 2 – contain
nearly the entire Internet (more than 50,000 ASs as of July
2015 [82], [83], cf. Fig. 5). More precisely, such graphs
contain all existing ASs and routes to reach them from
a particular vantage point, but not necessarily all possible
routes between any two ASs. Therefore these maps provide
a local perspective on the global AS routing table, notably
in terms of access to remote transit. We decided to simplify
the dataset and limit our analysis to the first hop of the AS
routes recorded in the RIPE dataset, since any second hop
in such a route would either:
• Be a link between two arbitrarily remote ASs, away
from the local IXP where the route was advertised,
and therefore not relevant to a local perspective.
• Be a local hop between two ASs in the same IXP
and therefore a duplicate of the first hop of another
route announced at the same IXP.
Figure 4: Example AS routing table for one RRC [80]: ver-
tices are ASs, edges are routes, vertices’ size is proportional
to their degree, i.e. the number of routes going through them.
Figure 5: AS count for the last 18 years [82].
Table 2 shows the difference between complete routing
tables and simplified routing tables for the 5 RRCs. Table 4
shows global statistics for the simplified dataset, i.e. for ASs
one hop away from a given vantage point. Such ASs could
still be anywhere in the world, as international carriers could
virtually peer with any part of the Internet. Special cases
such as VPNs excepted, ASs appearing on the routing tables
are therefore “one physical network” away from the vantage
point – be it a local ISP or a global carrier.
We checked the consistency of the routing tables in two
ways. Firstly, we computed the intersection between the five
routing tables (both complete and simplified): Table 2 shows
that they are indeed significantly overlapping. Secondly, we
took the following approach:






rrca ∩ rrcb ∩ rrcc
∩ rrcd ∩ rrce 51113 22838
TABLE 2: Cross-validation of datasets.
ASN Name Tier-1 Average Average Caidarank degree Rank [84]
3356 Level3 * 1.8 3968 1
174 Cogent * 2.2 3781 2
6939 HE 2.8 3309 8
6461 Abovenet 7.8 1261 16
3257 Tinet/GTT * 9.6 1102 5
9002 RETN 11.8 1353 19
1299 Telia * 12.8 939 3
2914 NTT * 13.8 1060 4
7018 AT&T * 18.8 1074 17
4323 TW telecom 19.2 1149 21
8220 COLT 20.2 603 55
3216 Vimpelcom 20.6 606 24
209 Qwest 20.8 791 18
13030 Init7 21.0 717 45
12389 RosTelecom 21.0 573 22
20485 TransTelecom 21.8 749 20
3549 Level3 * 25.6 587 9
701 Verizon * 25.6 571 13
2828 XO 25.6 552 10
43531 IX Reach 26.0 570 209
TABLE 3: Highest average-rank ASs (ranked by degree in
each RRC).
• We computed the degree of each AS in the 5 RRCs.
• We ranked ASs by degree in the 5 RRCs.
• We compared the highest-rank ASs with several
indicators, such as Caida’s AS-rank (measuring the
number of customers worldwide) and the list of tier-
1 ASs (Table 1).
Table 3 shows an average result of this ranking on the five
RRCs. All ASs represented here are either tier-1 or top tier-
2 ASs, as denoted by their high rank on the CAIDA ranking
system (based on the number of ASs in the customer cone).
This demonstrates that the routing tables are consistent
with other established sources of data. Also, this strongly
indicates that ASs with a very high rank on average on
the five sources are likely to be major interconnectivity
providers between the European IXPs where the routing
tables were recorded.
4.3. Data Limitations
The data is not free of biases however. Some notable
networks are missing in Table 3: one would expect major
European networks such as Deutsche Telekom (AS3320),
Telecom Italia Sparkle (AS6762), British Telecom (AS5400
and AS2856) or France Telecom (AS5511) to be well repre-
sented in the routing tables. Also, when considering RRCs
individually, some of the highest-degree ASs are peripheral
regional networks (not shown here). This can be explained
by several reasons:
• RIPE data is gathered on the basis of voluntary con-
tributions that tend to exaggerate the importance of
the contributors in the routing tables. This explains
notably local biases towards some particular local
networks.
• The routing tables are recorded in IXPs and do not
capture private peering and customer agreements at
private colocation points, that some transit providers
favour over public IXPs.
This means that the view provided by the RRCs captures
only the tip of the iceberg and misses important parts of
the infrastructure: a significant consideration to keep in
mind when interpreting the following disruption scenar-
ios. However partial, the data is representative enough: the
number of ASs captured in the routing table is significant
(Table 4), the degree distributions are similar (Fig. 6) and the
topology analysis presented in the following sections yield
similar results for all five sources with no particular outlier.
The results we present are therefore relevant and insightful
despite the limitations of the dataset.
To achieve a comprehensive analysis of the entire Euro-
pean infrastructure, considerable cooperation between ser-
vice providers would be required to allow a multi-vantage-
point view of the network. Since BGP messages are ex-
changed via point-to-point TCP connections, they are not
easy to monitor from a unique remote listener. Ideally,
by positioning several BGP-message listening servers at
key locations in the infrastructure (determining the exact
locations of which would also require coordination with
ISPs), it would be possible to collect enough information to
build a near-complete map of Europe’s Internet. Significant
efforts are carried by RIPE in this direction [85].
5. Topology Analysis & Attack Scenarios
In this section, we study the topology of the backbone
in the light of known attack vectors and we investigate
disruption scenarios. Section 3 established that ASs could
be taken down – individually or collectively – via a number
of means:
• Physical attacks on colocation points.
• Disruptions of major landlines and undersea cables.
• Traffic disruptions (hijacks, DDoS).
• Other attacks, such as common mode failures.
In this section, we first look at the high end of the threat
spectrum: we study the global topology of the backbone and
we investigate global blackout scenarios necessitating heavy
attack capabilities. Then we consider the low end of the
spectrum: individual AS disruptions – achievable with more
limited offensive resources – and their potential effect on the
rest of the backbone in terms of traffic re-routing. Finally
we discuss the domain in between, in particular regarding
the risk of cascading failures.
average links (in proportion)
RRC # ASs # links degree held by the 40
(± 0.1) highest-degree ASs
rrca 36634 69261 1.9 40519 (59%)
rrcb 32927 60069 1.8 36503 (61%)
rrcc 25110 42759 1.7 27541 (64%)
rrcd 38808 81062 2.1 44665 (55%)
rrce 31568 61139 1.9 39222 (64%)
TABLE 4: Global statistics for the 5 routing tables.
Figure 6: Head of the decreasing degree distribution.
Network topology analysis for the sake of security seems
to be limited to the study of the possible impact of BGP
hijacks, e.g. [7], [8], [86]. These works discuss how to
exploit the three-layer logical topology of the infrastructure
to maximise the impact of prefix hijacks. To our knowledge,
our study is the first to extend this type of approach to other
types of threats – such as DoS and physical attacks – and
to combine a study of the logical and physical topologies
of the infrastructure.
5.1. Large-scale Disruptions
Large-scale blackouts can be achieved by taking down
all transit providers via simultaneous attacks. Fig. 6 shows
the head of the degree distribution for all five RRCs – i.e.
ASs with the highest number of links. As expected in scale-
free graphs, high-degree vertices concentrate a majority of
the graphs’s edges. As shown in Tables 4 and 6, for each
RRC, the 40 highest-degree ASs (i.e. the top 0.1%) hold
more than half of the links in the graph, while the degree of
the 40th AS is less than 10% of the degree of the first AS.
The average degree in the routing tables is around 2, which
is due to a large majority of tier-3 ASs being connected to
only a couple of access providers.
Such a scenario would require significant offensive ca-
pabilities and planning, which makes it unlikely outside of
global crisis situations. The exact consequences of large-
scale failures are hard to determine, as it is not clear how
the rest of the Internet interfaces with the particular subsets
of the BGP infrastructure investigated here. There is little
experience in the domain, the best guess one can make
then is that national failures would certainly have knock-
on effects on other national backbones.
AS rank orphan re-routable
(by degree) nodes links
1 1188 (1.7%) 4588 (6.6%)
2 838 (1.2%) 4045 (5.8%)
3 410 (0.6%) 3083 (4.5%)
4 946 (1.4%) 2049 (3.0%)
5 718 (1.0%) 1840 (2.7%)
6 150 (0.2%) 1726 (2.5%)
7 105 (0.2%) 1275 (1.8%)
8 454 (0.7%) 1269 (1.8%)
9 257 (0.4%) 1236 (1.8%)
10 121 (0.2%) 1221 (1.8%)
TABLE 5: Effect of taking down individual transit providers
in rrca. Percentages measure the proportion with respect to
the total number of routes in the routing table.
Recovery from global failures is a completely uncharted
territory with no precedents. The lack of explicit coordina-
tion procedures between ASs could be problematic, since
uncontrolled traffic could disrupt the restoration of connec-
tivity, especially in case all transit providers have been taken
down: connectivity would have to be rebuilt progressively
to prevent the first restored transit providers from crumbling
under excessive load. Again, simulation is the only way to
envision such scenarios, as a large-scale failure situation is
unprecedented.
5.2. Local Disruptions
Taking all core ASs down simultaneously may not be
necessary to significantly disrupt the BGP infrastructure.
Given that high-degree transit providers concentrate a large
portion of the traffic, shutting down a single one of them
would re-route a traffic surge through other transit providers.
Leaf ASs that depended on the dead AS only would be
orphaned and lose connectivity with the rest of the infras-
tructure. In this section, we investigate the effects of such
a targeted attack and we estimate the corresponding traffic
surge (or load repercussion) on the rest of the backbone.
Taking down a large (possibly tier-1) AS still requires
significant attack means, as these networks span over several
continents. Section 3 has shown a number of means that can
be exploited to achieve such a result:
• Logical attacks such as hijacks can disrupt access to
and from an entire AS.
• Targeted attacks (DoS, packet of deaths) can take
down routers at particular choke points.
• Physical attacks on choke points such as undersea
cables and IXPs can literally sever connections large
sections of the backbone rely on.
• Combinations of such attacks can also be considered,
for instance: altering routing tables to concentrate
traffic towards a particular physical link or place that
is then physically attacked.
Such attacks carried with unprecedented means can af-
fect targets comparable in size to international carriers –
although in practice, several networks or entire geographical
regions would be affected. The rest of this section considers
taking down individual ASs since it is simpler to consider
from a simulation point of view while still relevant in terms
of the order of magnitude of the disruption.
Without precise traffic information, it is difficult to eval-
uate accurately the effect of an AS being taken down. As a
first estimate, Table 5 shows, for each transit provider, the
number of orphan nodes that would end up disconnected,
the number of lost links that could be re-routed by the rest
of the infrastructure, and corresponding proportions these
numbers represent compared to the total number of routes
in the network. This proportion gives a first estimate of the
amount of traffic that would be re-routed by the rest of
the infrastructure. We complement this global consideration
with local traffic estimates based on the logical topology
around the victim AS.
Load repercussion model: The direct knock-on effect
of taking an AS down can be estimated more precisely by
measuring how big is the traffic surge that would have to be
re-routed through other transit providers. In the absence of
precise traffic data, we propose the following simple model,
illustrated in Fig. 7. Each edge in the AS graph – i.e. each
direct route between two ASs – is supposed to carry the
equivalent of one unit of traffic. Then, the load of each node
– i.e. the amount of traffic the AS handles – is equal to the
sum of all traffic on its edges, in other words its degree.
This estimate does not account for the direction of the
traffic (coming from or going towards neighbours), nor for
the capability of ASs to handle traffic. Supposing that all
routes carry the same amount of traffic is an oversimplifica-
tion that cannot bring meaningful results on a small scale:
this traffic model is only useful when considering orders of
magnitude on a large number of routes, where averages start
being statistically significant.
The approximation helps estimating the traffic volumes
to be re-routed during disruptive attacks: supposing that
one core AS has been taken down, its neighbours (peers
and customers) will shift their traffic on alternative paths
and create an overload that can be estimated in terms of
number of routes. Let degi denote the degree of a node i
and v a victim AS being taken down, then each AS n in the




on each of its own neighbours c ∈ Nn (i.e. one unit of traffic
split equally among its own degn−1 remaining neighbours).
Then, any AS c in the neighbourhood of the neighbours of
victim v (and in particular, when c is another core AS) would





Then this overload can be compared to the usual traffic




Let us illustrate the model in Fig. 7. If node B is taken
down, nodes AB1 and AB2 each re-route one link onto node
A (∆AB1→A = ∆AB2→A = 1), node BC1 re-routes one
unit of traffic onto C(∆BC1→C = 1), while node ABC1 re-
routes one link onto A and C (∆ABC1→A = ∆ABC1→C =
1/2). This estimate preserves the total amount of traffic in
the graph before and after disruption (minus orphan nodes
the disruption disconnects completely, such as nodes A1 to
A3 if node A were taken down). In total, A receives an extra
traffic of ∆A = 1 + 1 + 1/2 = 2.5, which is approximately
one third of its usual load (∆%A = 2.58 = 0.3125). However
simple at such a small scale, the model becomes relevant
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Figure 7: Load model illustration: one edge = one unit of
traffic.
Model discussion: Counting the number of affected ASs
and paths is the usual model for BGP disruptions in the
literature [7], [8], [25], [27], [29], [30], [32]. This method is
sometimes refined by counting affected prefixes [27], [29],
[30] which allows to measure their length [30] or count
affected IPs [29]. The refinements allow to discriminate
ASs by their size, however this type of analysis has a
cost: reconstructing the prefix graph is non-trivial. Also,
there is no evidence that such refinements yield significantly
different results. Determining whether or not it is significant
is beyond the scope of this work.
AS-level analysis can be coupled with traceroute data
and latency measurements between individual ASs [37].
Such models are based on an important monitoring infras-
tructure that is not available to the public. Similar public
traceroute data (e.g. [87]) is fragmented and does not map
to areas covered by the AS routes studied in the paper.
The way traffic would be redistributed cannot be pre-
dicted without access to detailed routing policies which
determine which alternative paths are used when a route
fails. These policies are implemented internally in BGP
routers, as they depend on commercial agreements and inter-
nal technical decisions. In practice, the average degree in the
graph is 2: this means that most customer ASs buy transit
from 1 to 3 providers: one being the main link whereas
the others are used as backups. In case the main provider
fails, traffic is redirected on the backups, depending on an
unknown order of preference.
Figure 8: Load repercussion when taking down individual
core ASs, in terms of absolute traffic.
Figure 9: Load repercussion when taking down individual
core ASs, in proportion to each AS’s normal traffic.
In the absence of routing policies, the model does not
discriminate between main provider and backups and as-
sumes an equal distribution of traffic between remaining
routes, as a statistical average would do. This approach does
yield consistent results: an alternative simulation redirecting
all traffic to one single remaining link (chosen at random)
produced exactly the same results (less than .1% difference).
Simulation results: Figures 8 and 9 show the appli-
cation of this model to the core of rrca, according to its
topology as of July 2015, in terms of absolute traffic and
relative to usual traffic respectively. The core we considered
is constituted of the 10 highest-degree ASs in the routing
table (cf. Fig. 6; the simulation could be extended to a larger
core, for instance the first 20 or 40 ASs: the results would be
the same for the top 10 anyway). The death of each transit
provider is considered, and for each of them, the estimated
knock-on effect ∆ on other core ASs is computed, in terms
of absolute traffic and ratio to the initial traffic handled by
the AS. For instance, in case AS 1 is taken down, AS 2
would undergo a load surge of 471 units of traffic (equivalent
to 471 routes), which represents 11% of its normal traffic.
Most load repercussions in the table represent less than 5%
of the normal traffic, which is likely not to constitute an
issue. Repercussions seem to be proportional to the degree
of the victim AS: the highest load surges would be created
by the death of the two highest-degree ASs and would
represent up to 15% of the usual traffic of other core ASs.
The same model was applied to the four other RRCs and
produced similar results in terms of order of magnitude.
Table 6 shows a summary of these simulations, in terms
of average and maximal load surge following the death of
a transit provider, both in absolute traffic and relative to
the normal traffic. These results are similar across the five
vantage points.
RRC average load maximum loadrepercussion repercussion
rrca 72 (3.3%) 471 (15%)
rrcb 62 (3.1%) 422 (14%)
rrcc 52 (3.9%) 250 (20%)
rrcd 76 (3.2%) 445 (14%)
rrce 73 (3.4%) 537 (13%)
TABLE 6: Summary of load repercussions following the
death of a single transit provider, in terms of absolute traffic
and proportionally to normal traffic (percentage).
5.3. Escalation Scenarios
In the absence of precise quantitative information, the
main qualitative conclusion one can draw is that disrupting
a single transit provider is likely to cause moderate traffic
variations on other ASs. The order of magnitude provided
by our estimate seems to rule out the possibility that the dis-
ruption of a single transit provider could trigger a cascading
failure. However, the continuum between (unlikely) high-
cost attacks taking down all core ASs at once and lower-cost
attacks taking down a single one of them is a grey area.
Simultaneous disruption of several transit providers, via
physical attacks on landlines and undersea cables, could still
generate significant traffic variations that would go beyond
the accumulated effect of individual disruptions. Modelling
these variations with more precision is key to being able to
anticipate possible cascading failures in a backbone. In the
meantime, it should be considered possible that a handful
of targeted attacks could generate a traffic re-routing surge
that proves too much of a load for the rest of the network to
handle. The resulting scenario would be a cascading failure
where a successful attack on key networks happens to take
down the whole infrastructure. This could in turn escalate
into a global failure.
6. Topology Improvements
In this section we discuss how studying and improving
the topology of the backbone can help mitigate attacks.
Decentralisation is key to the robustness and resilience
of both physical and logical topologies. We propose two
indicators to measure decentralisation:
• A local indicator: the number of links between non-
core ASs and transit providers. The more an AS has
Figure 10: Effect of increasing core-connectivity (case 1), increasing core size (case 2) and both improvements combined
(case 3) on the distribution of the 10 highest load surges.
direct routes to transit providers, the more backups
are available in case one of them is disrupted2.
• A global indicator: the number of core ASs in a
backbone. The larger this number is, the smaller load
repercussions will be in case one of them is taken
down.
These indicators provide heuristics for increasing the
backbone’s robustness and resilience. These concepts are
illustrated in Fig. 11: starting from a low-connectivity, small-
core network (bottom left), one can increase the number
of transit providers (top left), the number of links towards













(case 2) (case 3)
(case 1)
Figure 11: Illustration of improvement to backbone topology
according to two orthogonal metrics.
2. Here, one must recall that the average degree in all routing tables
is around 2 (cf. Table 4) which means that there is significant room for
improvements in this department.
case 1 case 2 case 3
reduction of average repercussion -0% -57% -62%
reduction of maximum repercussion -19% -72% -78%
TABLE 7: Summary of improvement experiments, averaged
over the five RRCs.
6.1. Experiment 1: Increasing Core-connectivity
We have simulated the effect of increasing the number
of links between core ASs and the rest of the backbone,
such as illustrated by going from left to right topologies
in Fig. 11. In this experiment, each non-core AS builds an
additional link towards a randomly chosen core AS it is not
already connected to (in case the AS is already connected
to all identified core ASs, then no link is created).
Due to the increase of core-connectivity, a victim’s
traffic is spread on more neighbours-of-neighbours – since
each of the victim’s neighbours has an additional route to
consider as a backup – and individual load surges on these
are less important. Globally this transformation increases
massively the degree of core ASs while shifting the degree
distribution one unit higher for all other ASs; in particular,
it removes all potential “orphans” from the network, as all
nodes are connected to at least 2 transit providers.
Fig. 10 (case 1) shows the results of applying this
procedure to the last known topology of the five RRCs. The
maximum load repercussion is reduced in all cases, while
the midspread remains stable. The minimum repercussion
increases slightly in all cases, as a consequence of the
increased degree of all transit providers. Table 7 (case 1)
shows a summary averaging the improvements over the five
RRCs: average load repercussions remain unchanged while
maximum repercussions are decreased by 19%.
6.2. Experiment 2: Increasing Core Size
We have simulated the effect of increasing the number
of core ASs in the backbone. For each core AS, a new twin
AS is created and connected to all existing core ASs, and
all the original AS’s non-core neighbours are re-connected
to the newly-created twin with a probability 1/2.
Increasing core size literally divides each core AS into
two parts: the death of a (half-)core is therefore half as
important in terms of affected traffic as before the improve-
ment. Also, the total number of links in the backbone is
unchanged (except for a few links between the newly created
AS and other core ASs), and the total number of core ASs
is doubled, such as illustrated by going from bottom to top
topologies in Fig. 11.
Fig. 10 and 7 (case 2) shows the results of applying
this procedure: on average, average and maximum load
repercussions are reduced by 57% and 72% respectively.
6.3. Experiment 3: Increasing Both Core Size and
Core-connectivity
In the last experiment, the two procedures of the two
previous experiments were applied sequentially: first the
number of core ASs was increased, then the connectivity
of all ASs to this extended core was increased by one link.
These two mechanisms are orthogonal: the first one
reduces the initial load surge, the second one spreads it on
more core ASes. Their combination does yield better results
than their individual application, as shown by the results on
Fig. 10 and Table 7 (case 3). The average amplitude of load
repercussions is reduced by 62% on average, compared to
the base case. The maximum amplitude of load repercus-
sions is reduced by 78% on average.
6.4. Discussion
Centralisation is often the result of performance-driven
design decisions, and decentralisation is generally a non-
profitable architectural evolution. The topology improve-
ments presented here all require to invest in developing the
backbone at both the global level (increasing the number of
transit ASs) and local levels (increasing core-connectivities).
In particular, an important conclusion of the experiments is
that the two policies can be followed in parallel, as the two
will increase the robustness of the backbone. A careful trade-
off analysis of security improvements against costs would
certainly be necessary to ensure the feasibility of topology
improvements.
Decentralising the logical architecture should provide an
opportunity to decentralise the physical architecture as well.
Spreading critical BGP hubs over national territories would
improve the robustness of the infrastructure against localised
physical attacks, incidents and power outages.
In the longer term, it is essential that both physical and
logical topologies of the Internet are thoroughly observed
and understood so as to avoid such centralised risks. This
requires continuous monitoring and analysis of the BGP
infrastructure, not limited to the scope of a national territory.
Additional investigation is also necessary to identify and
better understand the hidden parts of the BGP infrastructure.
Global supervision of the Internet raises the question
of authority and information confidentiality. As discussed
before, it is unclear which institutions would be in charge
of observing and controlling parts of the infrastructure’s
topology. Whatever governance model is chosen, it will
probably rely on several layers of management partitioning
the system into recursive, decoupled domains.
7. Limitations & Future Work
7.1. Partial Information is a Security Issue
This paper presents the results of an analysis of the BGP
infrastructure in Europe in the light of various attack vectors.
These results identify serious security issues regarding the
topology of a critical infrastructure, and the shortcomings of
available information sources are major limiting factors that
require deep further research. First and foremost, the BGP
map in section 5 the whole analysis relies upon has several
limitations, already discussed. Its limited scope in space
hides important dependencies of the different backbones
between themselves and towards the rest of the worldwide
BGP system. However, this partial data has revealed regular
topological patterns that should be considered relevant for
at least portions of the global system. Future work will
focus on trying to complement existing data with a more
exhaustive model of the infrastructure, drawing from dif-
ferent data sources. Several research initiatives have been
recently started in this direction [85], [88], [89].
More knowledge is necessary to investigate escalation
scenarios precisely. The simple estimates computed in this
study only provide a rough order of magnitude of possible
traffic re-routing during an attack – it is however the best
guess one can make with the data that is currently available.
Investigating AS disruptions beyond core ASs – e.g. looking
at multiple tier-2 ASs, regional disruptions – and their conse-
quences, both logical and physical, is necessary. Analysing
the topology of the backbone and its robustness over the
course of several years would be a interesting indicator.
Actual traffic volumes and maximum capabilities per route
and per AS are key information that would allow to model
the network with sufficient accuracy.
Major vulnerabilities of the visible BGP infrastructure
are due to its centralised topology and consequent vulnerable
points – undersea cables, colocation points, transit providers
– where an attack could disrupt the entire infrastructure sig-
nificantly. The exact importance of these vulnerable points
is difficult to ascertain, as it depends on possible invisible
dependencies and opaque management policies. The lack
of documentation and studies of BGP topology is again a
significant danger, since it is unclear whether the relevant
authorities are aware of the situation – or indeed, if there are
well-defined relevant authorities to deal with the situation.
Several security scenarios are presented in section 5,
each of them opening rich perspectives. Further comparison
is necessary with the large corpus of traffic engineering and
security investigations on BGP, in addition to experience
reports from the field. In turn, such scenarios are a potential
basis for deeper analysis and security exercises, or war
games, that improve the reactivity of system administrators
while improving the knowledge about the system.
7.2. Applicability to Concrete Backbone Enhance-
ments
The importance of dynamic events and ripple effects in
security scenarios and the difficulty of foreseeing their actual
consequences is key to understand the risk of backbone
disruptions. A major follow-up of this study would be the
implementation of a large-scale BGP simulator refining the
approach presented in this paper. Fuelled with past and live
routing data – not necessarily limited to RIPE – such a simu-
lator would allow to perform in-depth analysis of the system
over extended periods of time, in terms of topology and
traffic patterns. Large-scale events and cascading failures
could be implemented and studied in details, which would
provide a precious help for establishing precise dynamical
models of this critical infrastructure.
In section 6, several robustness and resilience solutions
are discussed and possible improvements are proposed. The
applicability of these improvements with respect to field
constraints is yet to be established, which is a matter of
business and political decisions as much as security. A
formal framework capturing the architecture of resilience
and robustness solutions for critical infrastructures would
support the activity of both technical actors and decision
makers. Also, such a framework would help in generalising
this security analysis to other kinds of critical infrastruc-
tures.
In every BGP incident in the literature, collective recov-
ery was performed in an ad-hoc, non-formalised fashion.
Clearly there is room for improvement in this area. Spec-
ifying an inter-AS collaboration protocol would improve
the global efficiency of the system for security and non-
security purposes such as traffic engineering, while formal
procedures open the way for recovery automatisation. Again,
this will raise the question of authority distribution to deter-
mine which institutions are in charge of managing such a
process. Establishing collaborative recovery solutions could
also help in framing what non-collaborative – or in other
words, openly hostile – situations would look like. Here
again, significant research and practical efforts – such as
war games – have to be conducted.
BGP networks are not the only critical assets of the
Internet. The Domain Name System and Certificate Author-
ities are examples of well-known infrastructures that prove
essential to the functioning of the network of networks.
The inter-dependencies between these different systems are
still a question to be investigated, not mentioning physical
infrastructures such as the power network. Again, develop-
ing a generic framework for modelling and improving the
robustness and resilience of mixed critical infrastructures
would be a significant step in this direction.
8. Conclusion
This paper presents the results of a security analysis of
the BGP infrastructure in Europe. The first main conclusion
is that despite good resilience against random failures, the
organic topology of the backbone could prove vulnerable to
a variety of targeted attacks. The core of the infrastructure,
composed of a small number of highly-connected transit
providers, is also its main weakness. Global disruption of
the infrastructure via a successful attack on this core, either
logical or physical, is to be considered possible and could
lead to unforeseen consequences at a global scale. Even lim-
ited individual attacks on core networks may escalate into
cascading failures, with seemingly unpredictable effects.
The second conclusion is that significant research efforts
are necessary to better understand and predict the behaviour
of the system. Most of the BGP infrastructure is still an
uncharted territory, which severely hinders any attempt to
analyse and improve its robustness and resilience. Interac-
tions between the BGP infrastructure and other critical in-
frastructures, such as the DNS or the power grid, are mostly
unexplored. This study proposes a series of improvements
to enhance the ability of system administrators to resist
and recover from major attacks. Yet, beyond the complex
technical, political and business involvement that is required,
knowledge about the infrastructure is by far the limiting
resource in this domain.
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